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The Effect of Available Trust Resources on a
Beneficiary's Eligibility for Governmental
Assistance: Recent Developments in Pennsylvania
INTRODUCTION

It is not uncommon for the beneficiary of a trust to be under the
institutional care of a state-run or state-related mental or medical
care facility or to otherwise be receiving some form of state aid
conditioned on financial need, such as general medical assistance.1
In the interest of preserving the integrity and economic viability of
its programs, the state, generally through one of its administrative
agencies, may attempt to compel the trustee of a trust to reimburse it for services or financial aid provided to the trust beneficiary.2 Three recent Pennsylvania cases have dealt with such a situation, with varying results. The trust at issue in each of these
cases was a "discretionary support trust" which explicitly conferred significant discretionary power on the trustee in deciding
whether a distribution should be made to the beneficiary, and
which also included language indicating a support standard to be
met with respect to that same beneficiary.' This comment will describe and distinguish these cases, as well as explain their analyses,
so that the reader may understand the current status of this aspect
of trust law in Pennsylvania. A summary of each of the three cases
will serve well as an introduction to this deceptively simple area of
trust law.
THE PENNSYLVANIA CASES

The first case, Stoudt v. Department of Public Welfare,' was an
appeal from an order issued by the Pennsylvania Department of
Public Welfare ("DPW") declaring that a beneficiary of a testa1. The scope of this comment is generally confined to Pennsylvania law, financial aid
programs and institutions.
2. The Pennsylvania agency most commonly involved in such activity is the Department of Public Welfare.
3. See generally Abravanel, DiscretionarySupport Trusts, 68 IOWA L. REv. 273 (1983)
[hereinafter Abravanell, for a discussion of such trusts.
4. 76 Pa. Commw. 576, 464 A.2d 665 (1983).
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mentary trust was ineligible for medical assistance payments due
to her status as the beneficiary under the trust. The beneficiary
had been a medical assistance recipient at a Berks County-operated nursing home ("Home") since June, 1978.6 When the Home
was informed that its patient had become the beneficiary of the
testamentary trust, it notified Berks County officials.' After a
DPW hearing, that agency determined that the corpus of the trust
was an "available resource," and therefore, that the beneficiary was
no longer eligible for medical assistance.'
The will which created the trust devised the residue of the estate
to the testator's nephew, as trustee, to manage the trust and "to
pay so much of the income and principal of said trust as he in his
sole discretion deems necessary for the maintenance and support
of my daughter, Eva E. Stoudt, for and during her natural life." 9
The will further provided that the trust was to terminate upon Eva
Stoudt's death with "the balance of the principal of said trust and
accumulated income, if any," to be paid to the testator's two
grandchildren.10
The commonwealth court affirmed the DPW's order on two
grounds.1" First, it held that the trustee was required to administer
the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.12 Second, it held
that because the beneficiary had the power to compel the trustee
to disburse assets in accordance with the terms of the trust, she
had an available resource."3 The appeal of Berks County, which
was brought in an attempt to protect any rights to reimbursement
for care provided to the beneficiary, was quashed on DPW's motion because the County was not a party below and, therefore,
lacked standing to appeal.' This brief commonwealth court opin5. Id. at 577, 464 A.2d at 666. The beneficiary died subsequent to DPW's order and
her husband was the appellant in the case. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. Medical assistance eligibility is determined by the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program standards. A qualified, unmarried person could not have more than
$1,500 of nonexcludable resources in 1984 (increased to $2,000 by 1988). 20 C.F.R. §
416.1205(a)(1988). An asset is a resource only if "the individual has the right, authority or
power to liquidate the property." Id. at § 416.1201(a).
9. 76 Pa. Commw. at 577-78, 464 A.2d at 666 (emphasis in original).
10. Id. at 578, 464 A.2d at 666 (emphasis in original).
11. Id. at 578-79, 464 A.2d at 666.
12. Id. at 578, 464 A.2d at 666 (citing Bolton v. Stillwagon, 410 Pa. 618, 190 A.2d 105

(1963)).
13. 76 Pa. Commw. at 579, 464 A.2d at 666 (citing Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal
Co., 488 Pa. 198, 412 A.2d 466 (1979)).
14. 76 Pa. Commw. at 579, 464 A.2d at 666-67.
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ion offered little in the way of analysis in arriving at its
conclusions.
The second case, Lang v. Department of Public Welfare,15 also
arose from a determination by DPW that the beneficiary of a testamentary trust, William George LeViseur, had available resources
and was, therefore, ineligible for medical assistance payments. 16
The state assistance had been used to pay expenses while LeViseur
was institutionalized in a state mental retardation center.' 7 The
commonwealth court affirmed DPW's order," but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding9 that the trust was not an
available resource to the beneficiary.'
The pertinent trust terms in the Lang case were set forth in Article FOURTH of the testator's will:
A . ..

(1)

During the lifetime of my son,

. .

. the Trustee shall pay the

Income periodically to or for the support, maintenance, welfare and benefit

of my said son or may, in the Trustee's discretion, add part or all of the
income to principal,...
(2) The Trustee may distribute such part of the Income not necessary for
the support of my son, in equal shares to my three children,...
(3) The Trustee shall use so much of the principal as may in her opinion be
advisable therefor, for the support, maintenance, welfare, comfort and support of my son . . . The Trustee shall have complete discretion as to how
much shall be used for such purposes and may pay the sums to any person
or institution having the care of my said son, without liability on the part of
the Trustee to see to the application thereof.. . 0

The will further provided that upon William's death the balance of
the trust would be distributed to the testator's three other
children. 1
In rejecting the commonwealth court decision, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court was very critical of the simplistic Stoudt analysis
employed therein. 2 The overarching question in the Lang court's
15. 515 Pa. 428, 528 A.2d 1335 (1987).
16. Id. at 431-33, 528 A.2d at 1337-38.
17. Id. at 436-37, 528 A.2d at 1339-40.
18. Id. at 431-32, 528 A.2d at 1337. The lower court based its affirmance on the Stoudt
case. Id. at 439, 528 A.2d at 1341 (citing Lang v. Department of Public Welfare, 76 Pa.
Commw. 576, 464 A.2d 665 (1983)).
19. 515 Pa. at 448, 528 A.2d at 1345.
20. Id. at 438, 528 A.2d at 1340-41 (emphasis in original).
21. Id. at 438-39, 528 A.2d at 1341.
22. Id. at 439-41, 528 A.2d at 1341-42. In addition to rejecting the Stoudt court's analysis, the supreme court also rejected, as a matter of public policy, the commonwealth court's
implication that it is in a beneficiary's interest not to be forced to resort to public welfare.
The supreme court did, however, agree that if the beneficiary could compel distributions
from the trust for his basic support, the distribution would be considered available for his

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 27:625

analysis was whether the trustee, who refused to pay the state, had
properly balanced the interests of the life beneficiary and the remaindermen 2 3 With this in mind, the state support in question
was held to be an available resource of the beneficiary because of
the state's statutory policy of supporting persons who, like
LeViseur, were over eighteen and qualified for benefits under the
24
Mental Health Act.
The next issue addressed in Lang was whether the settlor/testator intended that the trust assets be utilized to support the beneficiary, regardless of the availability of other resources such as state
assistance.2 5 This issue appropriately shifted the focus to the wording of the testator's will,26 specifically to Article FOURTH (set
forth above).2 7 The court attempted to categorize the trust, and in
doing so, refused to limit its choices to "support trust" or "discretionary trust. '28 It was concluded that the trust was a discretionary
trust limited by a support standard-later referred to by the court
as a "discretionary support trust."" Without a specific statement
in the instrument as to whether the testator intended the trustee
to consider other resources available to William, including state
aid, in determining whether to distribute principal or income for
his "support, maintenance, welfare and benefit," the court looked
for other indicia of the settlor's intent."
use. Id. at 441, 528 A.2d at 1342.
23. Id. at 441, 528 A.2d at 1342.
24. Id. The 1974 amendment of the Mental Health Act relieved those with a legal duty
to provide support to persons receiving benefits under the Act from continuing that support
beyond the recipient's eighteenth birthday. Id.
25. Id. The use of the phrase "available resources" with respect to outside resources,
such as state aid available to a beneficiary, must be differentiated from the use of that same
phrase in a conclusory fashion by the courts in determining that trust assets (principal and/
or income) are to be included in a calculation of a beneficiary's eligibility for benefits under
a governmental program.
26. Id. The court repeated the axiom that the settlor's intent must be determined
"from all the language within the four corner's of the trust instrument, the scheme of distribution and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument." Id. at 441-42,
528 A.2d at 1342 (citing Farmers Trust Co. v. Bashore, 498 Pa. 146, 150, 445 A.2d 492, 494
(1982)).
27. 515 Pa. at 442, 528 A.2d at 1342-43. The court emphasized the discretion explicitly
given to the trustee to add income to principal and to invade the principal for William's
support or benefit. The phrase "complete discretion" indicated a broad grant of discretion.
Id.
28. Id. at 442, 446, 528 A.2d at 1342, 1344. See generally Abravanel, supra note 3, for
a detailed discussion of trust categorization and the modern trend toward recognizing the
special characteristics of discretionary support trusts.
29. 515 Pa. at 442-43, 528 A.2d at 1342-43.
30. Id. at 442-43, 528 A.2d at 1343.
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The following factors were identified as supporting the conclusion that the settlor intended that the trustee consider other resources: 1) the use of a discretionary support trust rather than a
"pure" support trust;31 2) the use of a single trust to benefit all
four of his children as opposed to separate trusts;3 2 and 3) the fact
that the beneficiary was already a recipient of state support at the
time the will was executed.3 3 This finding, that other resources
could be considered before any distributions to William, seemed to
satisfy the court that the trustee had properly balanced the interests of the life beneficiary and the remaindermen.3 4 The order of
the commonwealth court that the trust was an available resource
for purposes of determining William's liability to reimburse the
state for the costs of his care or for medical assistance payments
received was, therefore, reversed. 5
It is important to note that the Lang decision, despite its harsh
criticisms, did not expressly overrule the Stoudt case.3 6 One plausible explanation for the supreme court's treatment of Stoudt is that
it was in agreement with the result of that case, or at least recognized that a reasoned analysis of the facts therein could have produced a decision in favor of DPW. Another possibility is that the
Lang decision was to be applied only to cases where the beneficiary
was receiving Mental Health Act benefits.37
The basic question after Lang was, and still is, how narrowly the
decision should be construed and applied. 8 The primary issue is
whether the holding only applies to situations where the trust beneficiary is receiving benefits under the Mental Health Act, or to all
cases where the beneficiary is receiving general medical assistance
from DPW while receiving care at a nursing home. A recent decision from the Court Of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, Orphans'
31. Id. at 443, 528 A.2d at 1343. See supra note 28.
32. 515 Pa. at 443, 528 A.2d at 1343. The court thought it significant that the trust
was funded with assets valued at sixty-seven percent of testator's net estate. Id.
33. Id.
34. 515 Pa. at 441, 528 A.2d at 1342.
35. 515 Pa. at 448, 528 A.2d at 1345.
36. 515 Pa. at 439-41, 528 A.2d at 1341-42.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 60-76 for a comparison of Lang and Stoudt.
38. The Lang court merely presented a method of analysis and applied it to a very
specific set of facts without expounding on the intended reach and application of the decision. However, at least one situation was described by the court wherein general medical
assistance will not be made available to trust beneficiaries. Such a scenario occurs when the
beneficiary is the sole beneficiary of a "support" trust and is receiving care in a nursing
home. The court distinguished such a situation from the one at issue. 515 Pa. at 440 n.8, 528
A.2d at 1341 n.8.
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3 apparently has
Court Division, Robins Trust,,
interpreted Lang to
be a very narrow holding limited to cases where the beneficiary has
been institutionalized under the Mental Health Act.
The Robins case concerned a testamentary trust arising under
the will of Matilda Robins, who died in 1976.40 The trustees were
to "apply so much of the net income and principal of the trust as
they deemed advisable for the comfortable maintenance and sup' '41
port of her son, Daniel Robins, and for his welfare generally.
Upon Daniel's death, the trustees were directed to distribute the
principal and any accumulated income to three named individuals
in the amount of $5,000 each, with the balance to be divided
equally among various charitable organizations.4 2 The trust terminated upon Daniel's death on December 12, 1986, and the account
was duly filed.4 3 At the audit, DPW entered a claim against the
trust for medical assistance payments made for the care and maintenance of Daniel, a diagnosed psychotic, while a resident at a
state-owned and operated custodial nursing home. The medical
assistance payments for which DPW was seeking reimbursement
had been paid for Daniel's support pending the outcome of the
trustees' appeal of a denial for medical assistance.4 5 The initial denial of medical assistance by the Franklin County Assistance Office
was based on the determination that the trust was an available resource of Daniel's which must be utilized before any public funds
could be provided.4 6 The administrative appeal process was voluntarily delayed by both parties pending the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's decision in Lang.47 After the Lang decision, both sides decided to abandon the administrative appeal process and present
8
the issue to the Orphans' Court by filing an account of the trust.'
The Robins court agreed with the Commonwealth that Lang did
not preclude recovery of the medical assistance payments provided
on Daniel's behalf while he resided in the state-run nursing

39. 8 Pa. Fiduc. 2d 213 (1988).
40. Id. at 214.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 215. Medical assistance was paid pending the outcome of the appeal process,
under the applicable state regulations. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 215-16.
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home.' Lang was held not to be controlling because the life tenant
was not committed to the home under the Mental Health Act and
the home itself was not governed by that act.5 0 The court stated
that if the life tenant could have compelled a distribution from the
trust for his support, then the Commonwealth could recover its
expenses."
The court looked to the express language of the trust instrument, coupled with the circumstances surrounding the testatrix at
the time the will was executed, and concluded that it was intended
that the trustees should provide for all of Daniel's needs from the
trust fund. 5 However, in recognition of the fact that it was a "discretionary support trust," the question of whether the testatrix intended for the trustees to consider the availability of other resources before making payments for Daniel's benefit was next
addressed.5" This question was answered in the negative because
nothing in the will manifested an intention that the availability of
other resources could be considered before making payments to
Daniel for his support.5 This led to the conclusion that the life
tenant could have compelled a distribution from the trust for his
support, and therefore, the commonwealth was entitled to reimbursement under a theory of implied contract. 55
An important feature of the Robins opinion is that the court initially distinguished Lang as not controlling because the Robins
beneficiary was a recipient of general medical assistance, as opposed to the Lang beneficiary who received benefits under the
Mental Health Act. 58 However, this distinction was only made by
the court to indicate that a determination of whether the income
and/or principal of a discretionary support trust can be considered
an available resource is one that must be made on a case by case
basis.57 The negative inference to be drawn from the court's approach to the Lang decision is that Lang was not confined strictly
49. Id. at 216.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 216-17 (citing Walter's Case, 278 Pa. 421, 123 A.2d 408 (1924)).
52. 8 Pa. Fiduc. 2d at 217-18.
53. Id. at 218. It was held that Lang required such an inquiry. Id.
54. Id. This was supported by reference to the general rule that a beneficiary of a
discretionary support trust is entitled to the inference that he or she is entitled to trust
distributions regardless of the availability of other resources. Id. (citing 2 A. Scorr, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS, § 128.4 at 354 (4th ed. 1987) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 128,
comment e (1959).
55. 8 Pa. Fiduc. 2d at 218.
56. Id. at 216.
57. Id.
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to cases wherein benefits under the Mental Health Act are at issue.5 8 If Lang was only applicable to cases dealing with the Mental
Health Act, the Robins court could have dispensed with the bulk
of its analysis and simply concluded that general medical assistance is not an available resource. 59 It is also possible that the Robins court made the Mental Health Act distinction to indicate that
the Lang decision was largely one of public policy, and that it
wanted to clarify that any policies being furthered in Lang were
not being overlooked in its decision.
DISCUSSION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA

CASES

The three cases discussed above are different in analytical approach, as well as result, leaving the practitioner to somehow distill
the applicable law from them. One trend that is evident from this
short line of cases is that the Pennsylvania courts now recognize a
hybrid form of trust, the discretionary support trust, 0 and will no
longer automatically categorize a trust as either a support trust or
a discretionary trust in reaching their decisions. 1 This enlightened
approach requires the courts to go beyond mere labelling in construing trust instruments. Hopefully, this will lead to more reasoned and just results which better accord with the intent of the
settlors and better balance the interests of the life beneficiaries
and remaindermen 2
58. It cannot be said for certain whether the court would have considered Lang as
controlling even if the Robins beneficiary was receiving benefits under the Mental Health
Act. This is true because of the court's conclusions which seem to indicate that it was the
testator's intent that the trustees were not to consider the availability of state support
under any entitlement program in making distributions to the beneficiary. This follows from
the statement that "there is nothing in the will which manifests an intention that the trustees consider the availability of other resources in making a determination that Daniel Robins is entitled to a payment for his support from the trust." Id. at 218. Of course, this is only
true if no distinction is to be made between different types of "available resources." In fact,
it may be that it is the nature of the available resource itself that strongly jnfluences the
courts when they are faced with answering the question of whether a trustee may properly
consider their availability before making distributions to the beneficiary.
59. The conclusion that the trustees should not have considered the availability of
other resources in deciding whether to make payments to the beneficiary, and the context in
which that conclusion is applied, indicate that the court did in fact consider the general
medical assistance to be an available resource. Id. at 218.
60. See Lang v. Department of Public Welfare, 515 Pa. 428, 443, 528 A.2d 1335, 1343
(1987); Robins, 8 Pa. Fiduc. 2d at 218.
61. See Stoudt v. Department of Public Welfare, 76 Pa. Commw. 576, 577-78, 464 A.2d
665, 666 (1983). Although the Stoudt court did not explicitly label the trust it was construing a support trust, it is clear from the simple analysis and conclusion therein that it considered the instrument to create such a trust.
62. See'Abravenel, supra note 3.
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The surfacing of this progressive analytical trend, although certainly a positive development, has not yet produced enough cases
to even roughly outline this area of the law so that practicing attorneys can use it in a predictable fashion. At this point, it appears
that a sole beneficiary of a support trust who requires nursing
home care may not receive general medical assistance benefits."3 It
is also true that a beneficiary of a discretionary support trust will
be permitted to receive Mental Health Act benefits where the trustee has power to sprinkle income among the primary life beneficiary's siblings, the siblings are also the remaindermen of the trust
and the trust constitutes the majority of the settlor's net estate."
However, these two situations represent polar extremes, and the
majority of the factual situations will fall somewhere between
them.
A reading of the three cases does indicate that the courts agree
that it is the issue of whether the beneficiary could compel distributions from the trust for his or her support that determines
whether the Commonwealth can require reimbursement for services and aid provided, or deny the right to such services.6 5 Where
the beneficiary has the power to compel such a distribution, the
state may require reimbursement.6 6 Unfortunately, this is merely
one way for a court to justify its result by simply closing its analysis with a statement to the effect of "therefore, the beneficiary
could have compelled a distribution from the trust for her support
and, for this reason, the state was entitled to reimbursement for
the aid provided. '6 7 Because this area of trust law remains unclear
and the analyses thus far employed by the courts can lead one into
logical circles, the best approach to predicting its future application may be to focus on the factual context and result of each case,
leaving the analytical process temporarily aside.
In Stoudt, the life beneficiary, who was the settlor's daughter,
was the only income beneficiary under the trust.6 There were also
63. See Lang, 515 Pa. at 440, 528 A.2d at 1341. This of course assumes that the total
corpus and/or the income of the trust is greater than allowable under the applicable
regulations.
64. See id. at 447-48, 528 A.2d at 1345.
65. See id.; see also Stoudt, 76 Pa. Commw. at 578-79, 464 A.2d at 666; Robins, 8 Pa.
Fiduc. 2d at 218.
66. See Lang, 515 Pa. at 447-48, 528 A.2d at 1345; Stoudt, 76 Pa. Commw. at 578-79,
464 A.2d at 666; Robins, 8 Pa. Fiduc. 2d at 218.
67. Stoudt, 76 Pa. Commw. at 579, 464 A.2d at 666; Robins, 8 Pa. Fiduc. 2d at 218.
68. Stoudt, 76 Pa. Commw. at 577-78, 464 A.2d at 666.
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remaindermen under the trust, the settlor's two grandchildren. 9 In
addition, the trustee was given the power to distribute principal to
the life beneficiary, and the trust explicitly set forth to whom the
remainder, "if any," was to pass. 70 The beneficiary was held not
eligible for medical assistance."
In Lang, there were, in addition to the life beneficiary, three
other children of the settlor to which the trustee could sprinkle
income not needed for the life beneficiary's support. 7' The Lang
trustee could also distribute principal to the life beneficiary, at its
discretion.73 The three siblings of the life beneficiary to which income could be sprinkled were also the remaindermen of the trust.74

The distinction between these two trust instruments is obvious.
The Lang court very clearly had to give great weight to the interests of the other three children since the trust was the bulk of their
father's estate and was obviously intended for their benefit. In contrast, the Stoudt court had no sprinkle provision to consider, the
remaindermen were further removed from the settlor and their interests were obviously secondary to the life beneficiary's. The same
was generally true in the Robins case, where only the life beneficiary had an income interest and the remaindermen were not his
siblings, but appeared to be more distant relatives, along with cer75
tain charities.

This simplistic factual comparison of these three cases ignores
the Mental Health Act aspect of Lang, but, nevertheless, suggests
several things for the practitioner to consider in advising clients on
their dispositive instruments. Where several children are involved
and separate trusts are not desired, a sprinkle provision with complete discretion given to the trustee to distribute or accumulate income should be considered. This provision should explicitly direct
the trustee to consider all other resources available to each of the
income beneficiaries before making distributions, including any
benefits available under federal, state or local programs. The remainder of the trust should pass to the various income beneficiaries. However, if one of them is already receiving governmental
69. Id.
70. Id. at 578, 464 A.2d at 666.
71. Id. at 579, 464 A.2d at 666.
72. Lang v. Department of Public Welfare, 515 Pa. 428, 438, 528 A:2d 1335, 1340
(1987).
73. Id. at 438, 528 A.2d at 1340-41.
74. Id. at 438-39, 528 A.2d at 1341.
75. Robins Trust, 8 Pa. Fiduc. 2d 213, 214 (1988). The relationship of the remaindermen to the settlor and the life beneficiary was not disclosed in the opinion.
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assistance at the time the trust is created, there should be no right
to invade principal for that beneficiary, and that individual and his
estate should be excluded from taking any of the remainder, if possible. Such clauses, along with the typical spendthrift provisions,
should be strongly considered if the settlor has an institutionalized
child or expects that one or more of his children may become institutionalized. Language directing the trustee to consider resources
such as governmental assistance before making distributions
should be considered in any trust instrument. Finally, it should be
noted that one Pennsylvania expert in this area has recommended
that practitioners avoid the usual "comfort, maintenance and support" language altogether, and use the "pure discretionary trust"
which grants unlimited authority to the trustee in making
distributions.76
The issue of whether Lang applies only to cases where the beneficiary is receiving benefits under the Mental Health Act is one
that must be settled to ensure that the Pennsylvania courts decide
these types of cases in a consistent manner. There are currently
two additional Pennsylvania cases pending wherein DPW is arguing for the narrow construction of Lang. It is fairly likely that one
of these cases will end up in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
where the issue can be settled. A very brief discussion of these two
cases follows.
THE PENDING PENNSYLVANIA

CASES

The two pending Pennsylvania cases are Commonwealth Bank

and Trust Company, N.A. v. Department of Public Welfare," and
Snyder v. Department of Public Welfare.78 Each case is an appeal
of a DPW ruling that a medical assistance applicant who was a
nursing home resident had available resources in a trust, and
therefore, was ineligible for the assistance. 9 In the Commonwealth
Bank case, DPW ruled that the principal of the trust was an available resource (the income was not at issue), and in the Snyder case
it ruled that both the principal and the income were available
80

resources.

76. See Frolik, DiscretionaryTrusts for a Disabled Beneficiary: A Solution or a Trap
for the Unwary?, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 335, 342-43 (1985) [hereinafter Frolik].
77. No. 1794 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988).
78. No. 2148 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988).
79. Brief for Respondent at 3, No. 1794 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988). Brief for Appellant
at 4, No. 2148 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988).
80. Brief for Respondent at 2, No. 1794 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988). Brief for Appellant
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Both of the aforementioned cases involve discretionary support
trusts, but the Commonwealth Bank trust is only discretionary
with respect to distributions of principal to the life beneficiary. 1
DPW is arguing in the Commonwealth Bank case that the Lang
holding was clearly limited to cases involving a beneficiary receiving care under the Mental Health Act. 82 In the Snyder case, DPW
again distinguishes Lang while supporting its position under the
holdings of the Stoudt and Robins cases."' The appellant in the
Commonwealth Bank case also cites Lang, without specifically
mentioning the Mental Health Act aspect of that case." Likewise,
the appellant in Snyder cites the Lang case, but avoids any discussion of it being limited to Mental Health Act situations.8 5 The
Snyder appellant does draw an analogy to the Mental Health Act
aspect of Lang (without reference to the Act), by stating that the
beneficiary was over eighteen, and therefore, the testator/settlor
had no duty to support him either before or after the testator's
death. Obviously, the ultimate resolution of the issues in these
two cases will go a long way towards clarifying this aspect of Pennsylvania trust law. A brief discussion of the facts of these two cases
and their resolution follows.
The trustee in Snyder was directed to distribute "as much of the
net income as may be necessary or desirable for the support, maintenance and care of my daughter, Ethel J. Snyder, and my son, Jay
W. Snyder. .. as [well] as so much of the principal as in the Trustee's discretion may be necessary or desirable for the support,
maintenance, and care of my two children Ethel and Jay. ' 87 The
remainder was to pass one-half to three named children of the testator's predeceased son and one-half to testator's third son, Ivan S.
Snyder.8 8 When the will containing the pertinent trust provisions
was executed, neither of the two income beneficiaries was institutionalized, although both required special care.8 9 These two beneficiaries were both over eighteen at the time, and the testator was
at 6, No. 2148 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988).
81. Brief for Appellant at 6, No. 1794 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988). Brief for Appellant at
10, No. 2148 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988).
82. Brief for Respondent at 11, No. 1794 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988).
83. Brief for Respondent at 6-9, No. 2148 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988).
84. Brief for Appellant at 8-10, No. 1794 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988).
85. Brief for Appellant at 9-16, No. 2148 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988).
86. Id. at 13.
87. Brief for Respondent at 4, No. 2148 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988).
88. Brief for Petitioner at 10, No. 2148 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988).
89. Id. at 10-11.
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not legally obligated to support them."
The trust had assets of over $225,000 when Jay Snyder's application for medical assistance was denied by DPW.9 1 Snyder was a
nursing home resident at the time, and his sister, although not institutionalized, was still under special care and required financial
support because of emotional deficiencies.9 2 As stated earlier, DPW
deemed both the income and principal available resources, and the
application was denied.
Analysis of the Snyder facts under the Lang decision indicates
that neither the principal nor the income of the trust are available
resources to Jay Snyder. Lang held that a trustee's decision not to
pay the state is permissible where the trustee has properly balanced the interests of the life beneficiaries and the remaindermen.93 Allowing the assets of the trust to be rapidly diminished
through payments for the nursing home care of one of the income
beneficiaries is clearly adverse to the interests of the Snyder remaindermen and of the other income beneficiary. In addition, the
trust at issue is a discretionary support trust with respect to both
income and principal distributions to the income beneficiaries. The
Lang court considered this a factor in support of the conclusion
that the settlor intended that the trustee consider other resources
before making distributions.
The two other factors cited by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Lang in support of this conclusion are also generally present in
Snyder. The settlor chose a single trust to benefit all of her children as opposed to separate trusts. 5 Also, although Jay Snyder
was not institutionalized at the time the will was executed, his deficient mental condition made it reasonably foreseeable that institutional care would eventually be required.96 It seems clear that
medical assistance was an available resource to Jay Snyder that
the trustee should have properly considered before making distributions of income or principal to the state to pay for his care.
Stated another way, Jay Snyder himself could not have compelled
such a distribution, given the availability of the state aid. Even
90. Id.
91. Brief for Respondent at 2, No. 2148 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988).
92. Brief for Petitioner at 5, No. 2148 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988).
93. Lang v. Department of Public Welfare, 515 Pa. 428, 442, 528 A.2d 1335, 1342
(1987).
94. Id. at 443, 528 A.2d at 1343.
95. See Brief for Petitioner at 13, No. 2148 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988).
96. Id. at 10.
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DPW would have to agree that, but for its inclusion of the trust as
an asset of Jay Snyder, Snyder would have qualified for medical
assistance. This analysis fails only if it is the law of Pennsylvania
that a trustee can never consider general medical assistance to be
an available resource to a beneficiary of a trust. Without legislation
to this effect, it is wholely illogical and against basic trust law principles for a trustee not to consider such resources in carrying out a
settlor's intent and balancing the interests of multiple beneficiaries
when empowered to do so under the terms of a discretionary support trust.
Application of the Lang analysis to the facts of the Commonwealth Bank case yields a similar result. DPW's inclusion of the
$25,000 principal balance of the trust as an available resource of7
the income beneficiary, Joan S. Frymire, is at issue in this case.1
The testamentary trust directed the trustees to pay the net income
to Frymire (the settlor/testator's mother), and "in their uncontrolled discretion, but having in mind the income or principal that
may be available to or for her from other sources, to pay over to
my Mother so much of the principal of this trust as my Trustees
shall deem needful or desirable for her support and inaintenance
"98 The specific reference to income or principal from other
sources was apparently included due to the existence of another
trust, created by Joan Frymire, the exhaustion of which necessitated the application for medical assistance. 9
The remainder of the trust was to pass under the residuary
clause of the will.100 The residuary clause created successive trusts,
with the income of the first trust to be distributed to the testator's
wife for her life, and the income of the succeeding trust, formed at
the wife's death, to be distributed to the testator's children. 0 1
Upon the death of the last surviving child, the principal of the
trust was to pass to the testator's issue then living, per stirpes. 0 2
Given the discretionary nature of the trust, the trustee's refusal to
exhaust the trust for the sole benefit of the income beneficiary, to
the detriment of the remaindermen, appears to be a rational balancing of interests and a furtherance of testamentary intent. The
three Lang factors in support of the conclusion that the settlor in97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
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Respondent at 2, No. 1794 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988).
Appellant at 6, No. 1794 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988).
Respondent at 3, No. 1794 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988).
Appellant at 6, No. 1794 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988).
Appellant at 6-7, No. 1794 C.D. (Pa. Commw. 1988).
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tended that the trustee consider other resources before making distributions of principal are also present in Commonwealth Bank.103
Finally, the income beneficiary could not have compelled a distribution of principle, given the availability of the medical assistance.
Once again, this analysis presupposes no legal rule against considering medical assistance to be an available resource to a trust
beneficiary.
CONCLUSION

This area of trust law is obviously at a crossroads in Pennsylvania. If it is eventually decided that only Mental Health Act benefits will be considered available resources in these types of cases,
the application of the Lang analysis will be very limited. Conversely, if Lang is held applicable to beneficiaries receiving general
medical assistance, i.e., for nursing home care, its reach will be far
indeed. However, a restrictive construction of Lang would be a
step too far into the public policy arena for the judiciary to take.
Such a construction would only be appropriate if mandated by legislative action designed to protect and conserve the limited resources of Pennsylvania's public assistance programs.
Given the current uncertainty in this area of trust law, legislative
involvement would be welcomed. As Mr. Frolik stated in his discussion of discretionary trusts reimbursing the state for the costs
of institutionalization:
Courts may make this decision, but the outcomes of individual cases are not
likely to be based upon anything other than the predilections of the court.
It would be far better that the legislature address the issue and establish a
rule, since judicial examination of individual cases will not lead to any wisdom about the correctness of a general rule.1'

Until this central issue is resolved, practitioners will simply have to
glean what they can from the few cases that have been decided,
and attempt to structure their clients' trust instruments accordingly. The previously discussed recommendations should serve as a
good starting point.
Anthony M. Tedesco

103.
104.

See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
Frolik, supra note 76, at 366.

